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1. Potential Benefits and Risks of a European MonetarγUnion 
1n November 1991 , some 12 years after the installation of the European Exchange-Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), a further step towards monetary integration in Europe was decided 
upon in Maastricht. This has led to an intensive debate among politicians and economists 
about the potential benefits and drawbacks of a European Monetary Union (EMU). 1n 
Germany, it is first and foremost the "scientific community" , .which doubts the benefits 
and emphasizes the risks concerning EMU (see BAßELER; et 訓， 1992; BAREIS; et al., 
1992), while most politicans and managers accentuate the benefits rather than the risks. 
1n the other member countries, however, the situation is somewhat different. 
As a matter of fact , the dispute about how much monetary cooperation and integratiòn in 
Europe should be pursued is anything but new. Ever since the ERM was insta l1ed, it has 
frequen t1y been discussed whether or not it is capable of improving exchange-rate 
stability and monetary convergence with a low level of inflation. Corresponding旬， it has 
also been disputed whether this system serves as an appropriate preparation for the next 
step, the EMU. This paper attempts to provide some answers to these questions. First, 
the most prominent potential benefits of a single European currency are briefly 
presented. Then, the ER孔l' s impact in forcing monetary convergence and stability in 
Europe is analyzed. The resulting question : Can a further monetary integration in the 
direction of a single European currency guarantee macroeconomic stability, both in the 
transition to EMU and later on is discussed in the third pa口 . Final1y, some remarks on 
the importance of fiscal discipline in the EC member states will be made 
The Commission of the EC identifies the following m句or benefits of a single European 
currency (COìv削ISSION， 1990; see also: GRos/THYGESEN, 1991 , pp. 98) : 
一 Transactions costs of intra-community trade and of trade with non-EC-countries 
decline, since an increasing share of world trade would be invoiced in the European 
Currency Unit (ECU) instead ofUS-$. 
Risks from exchange rate variability decrease. As long as the share of trade with non-
EC-countries invoiced in ECU increases, problems of exchange-rate variability of the 
US-$ become irrelevant. 
EC banks will have more comprehensive opportunities. These will arise from the fact 
that all activities of Community banks inside EC member states wi I1 be based on one 
single currency, which will then be the domestic currency for all European banks 
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一 The European Central Bank (ECB) will reduce its international reserves. Since there 
will be no need for exchange-market interventions within the Community, 
international reserves could be reduced by approximately 200 billion US-$. 
Furthermore, since more ECU reserves will be held global旬， seignorage revenues for 
the ECB ofsome 0.045 percent ofEC's GDP could be generated 
一 Macro-policy coordination in the Community will improve. Since there will be only 
one authority concerned with monetary policy, coordination of stabilization policy 
should become easier. Coordination of monetary and exchange-rate policy worldwide 
could also benefit from the EMU, since there will be only the ECB to negotiate with. 
As a further po1itical benefit, the EMU could serve as a motor for poHtical 
integration in Europe, forcing politicans and bureaucrats to cooperate more fully and 
develop more efficient decision-making processes. 
However, it is not yet clear whether these positive resu1ts can be realized with the help of 
EMU or, if they can, how much of the Community' s welfare could be boosted. Not 
surprisingly, sceptics have concentrated on the risks of EMU. 1n Germany, the leading 
question is how much macroeconomic stability can be guaranteed by a European Central 
Bank. Will such a bank be able to aim its policy on price stability alone, or will it just 
compromise between, at least, twelve different points along the Phi l1 ips curve? At the 
same time undue transitional shocks are feared in the event of a poorly prepared slip into 
the monetary union, similar to the problems following the German monetary union in 
1990. The problem of preparation leads us back to ERM, the basis on which EMU w i1l 
be set up 
2. Did ERM Force Monetary Stability and Convergence in Europe? 
ERM has been viewed as a success by its proponents primarily because it has fostered 
both higher monetarγconvergence and the stability of member states. Both convergence 
and stability are important for an EMU for two reasons: First, they are necessary 
preconditions for a transition to EMU without undue monetary and real-economy 
shocks. Second, to the extend that higher convergence and stability are in fact a resu1t of 
monetary cooperation via ERM, this system can be seen as a proper instrument to 
prepare EMU with the help of a gradually intensified monetary cooperation. 
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Unfortunately, the successful evolution of ERM since 1987 was interrupted in mid 1992: 
After only two years of British, Spanish and Portuguese membership as well as the 
introduction of normal 1talian exchange-rate margins, intensive currency speculations and 
imbalances forced the community to realign. Moreover, Italy and the UK even left the 
mechanism temporarily. And in August 1993 , the exchange-rate margins have been 
extended from 2.25 percent to 15 percent in each direction. Considering the fundamental 
data of the respective countries, pa口 of this development should not have surprised 
anybody. The British pound entered the ER孔1 with an overvalued exchange rate, and 
since then considerable differences in inflation among the ERM-currencies have 
undermined the stability of the ERM parity grid . However, the evolving enthusiasm for 
European integration following the Single European Act in 1986 sometimes diverted 
attention 丘om economic reality . The following section will address the question as to 
how far ERM could have forced higher convergence and stability of its member states 
2. 1. Major Theoretical Arguments 
1n theo句， there are at least three arguments for a stabilizing role of ERM (SÌ\-伍E芯，
1993): First, as far as those countries which are obliged to purchase foreign currency to 
prevent appreciations realize to neutralize the expansion of their monetary base, the 
symmetry of interventions ' effects on the monetary base will be undermined in favor of a 
bias towards more stability. This is also true to the extend that intra-marginal 
interventions within the ER孔1 dominate. 1n this case, as long as the intervening central 
bank uses its own foreign exchange reserves or takes on credit from the capital market, 
there is a contractive monetary effect but no corresponding expansive effect in the other 
country. Between 1979 and 1990, approximately 73 percent of the interventions' 
expansive effects on the monetary base in Germany could be neutra1ized by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. At the same time, more than 88 percent of all exchange-market 
interventions were intramarginal interventions. Thus, successful neutralization policies, 
as well as intramarginal interventions, have obviously given some asymmetric bias 
towards more monetary stabi1ity in the ERM-states. 1n the long run, however, different 
monetary growth rates , and thus, different inflation rates, cannot be maintained without 
either a rea1ignment or a convergence of monetary growth. 
Second, given that exchange rates are fixed or can only f10at within some limits, inf1ation 
leads to a real appreciation, and hence, to a loss in international competitiveness. Given 
that political competition works, this puts pressure on politicians to avoid in f1ation. 
Third, even if actual rates of in f1 ation are equal, a higher interest rate will be necessary in 
countries which are regarded as less able to maintain price stability. This could result in a 
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more restrictive monetary policy in those countries which have relaxed monetary control 
in the past. 
Those effects may have contributed to monetary stability in Europe in the past, with the 
Deutsche Mark as the dominating currency (see HERZ!RÖGER, 1992). As monet的
integration proceeds, some ot these effects are likely to decrease in importance, while 
others could become even more important (for a public-choice perspective, see: VON 
HAGENIFRA TIANNI, 1991) 
2.2. Empirical Evidence 
A tendency towards convergence as well as stability is most striking in the development 
of inflation rates (see Table 1). ln 1979, the average growth rate of consumer prices in 
the 8 original ERM-countries (including Italy) was 9 .45 percent with a standard 
deviation of 4.26. Both figures rose considerably within the follwing year (13.16 percent 
inflation with 6.2 standard deviation) but then dropped steadily to 3.91 percent and 1.45, 
respectively. 
Table 1: Level and Standard Deviation of Inflation in the Original ERM. 
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Long-term interest rates evolved similarly (see Table 2). In 1979, the average return on 
bonds amounted to 10.87 percent, climbing up to 14.65 percent in 1982. During the 
same period, the standard deviation rose from 3.18 to 4 .43. After 1982, however, return 
on bonds dropped to 9.3 percent with a standard deviation of only 0.95. While the 
smallest and largest return in 1979 was 6.8 and 15 percent, resu1ting in a range of 8.2 
percentage points, this range narrowed to 3.4 percentage points in 1991 (from 8.2 to 
11.6 percent). According to this data, the ERM obviously brought about some 
stabilization as wel1 as a higher convergence within the member states. In fact , since 
changes of nominal interest rates are highly correlated to changes in inflation, both 
resu1ts can be attributed to a greater monetary stability in general (see also : BAYOU悶，
1992) 
Table 2: Level and Standard Deviation of Long-Term Interest Rates* in the 
Original ERM Countries** 
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A less clear tendency towards convergence and stability can be observed in the growth of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Not surprisingly, overall growth rates of GDP followed 
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the well-known cycles of the 80's and early 90's. But the standard deviation of growth 
rates has not declined significant1y since 1979 (see Table 3) 
Table 3: Level and Standard Deviation of GDP-Growth in the Original ERl\ι 
Countries* 
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Source: Author ' s calculations, based on Eurostat data. 
* Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and lreland . 
Table 4 gives the same impression. It shows the symmetry in the European business 
cycles as correlation coefficients of the member countries' trend adjusted real GDP 
growth-rates. ln the first row of the respective count句， coefficients of the period 
between first qua付er of 1979 to the last quarter of 1991 are shown; the second row 
presents the period between first qua口er of 1987 to last qua口er of 1991. It shows, that 
not only are coefficients surprisingly low, but that most even decreased in the latter 
period . 
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Table 4: Symmetη， of Business Cycles in Europe 
G FRA ITA NEL BEL UK DEN 
G 0.27 0.65 0.70 0.53 0.30 0.36 
0.16 -0.01 0.62 0.47 -0.33 0.00 
FRA 0.51 0.14 0 .49 0.50 -0.01 
0.79 0.53 0.59 0.61 -0.25 
ITA 0.25 0.62 0.38 0.12 
0.08 0.49 0.85 -0.15 
NEL 0 .47 0.31 0.35 
0.96 -0.09 -D.07 
BEL 0.43 0.31 
0.79 0.5-' 
UK 0.29 
-0.06 
DEN 
1979 to 1991 printed in normal type; 1987 to 1991 printed in bold face. 
Source: H .-D. SMEETS (1992). 
The low convergence in business cycles can partly be explained by the special 
development of Germany since the end of 1989, following the breakdown of the German 
Democratic Republic. The potential for an economic slowdown, \vhich could be 
observed all over Western Europe, was quickly offset by a surge in demand, sending 
Germany into a "reunion boom" , while at the same time France, the UK and other 
European countries slipped into a serious recession. Since then, Germany has been hit by 
the recession as wel1. A11 in all, even if symmetry in business cycles is still low, there has 
obviously been some convergence within ERM, particularly in the case of monetary data 
(see also : COtvfMITT凹， 1992 , pp. 17~ KLE肘， 1991) 
Unfortunately, the latest events in the European financial markets point in the opposite 
direction. Future development will show wether the widening of the exchange-rate 
margins are able to fight speculative attacks and to reestab1ish stability and convergence 
as it has been the case up to 1992. 
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3. Will EMU be a Union of Monetary Stability? 
3.1. Fundamental Properties of EMU 
According to the DELORS-Plan and the Treaty of Maastricht, the EMU will be set up in 
three stages, the first of which was launched on 1 January 1990. This first stage was 
intended to foster cooperation between the national central banks. Remaining restrictions 
on capital movement will be abolished and all member states of the EC should have been 
integrated into the ER孔1. The second stage will see the establishment of a European 
Currency Institution, the main task of which is to coordinate national monetary policies 
and to make the institutional arrangements necessary for the foundation of the European 
Central Bank. This second stage ofE孔1u is scheduled to begin on 1 January 1994. Iñ the 
third stage of EMU, the ECB is to be founded in order to lay the groundwork for 
monetary union. Monetary union wi l1 be realized either by issuing but one single currency 
from the beginning of EMU or by the irrevocable fixing of nominal exchange rates 
Simultaneously, responsibility for monetary policy wi l1 be shifted from the national 
central banks to the ECB . According to the Treaty of Maastricht, stage Two will begin 
either in 1997 or in 1999, depending on the degree of economic convergence and 
stability achieved up to 1996 
Convergence and stability will be measured with the help of certain criteria. Concerning 
monetary policy, a limit on intlation and on long-term interest rates exists : these must not 
exceed the respective rates of the three countries with the lowest intlation by more than 
1. 5 and 2.0 percentage points, respectively. Additionally, there are two criteria for fiscal 
stability and convergence: current budget deficit must not exceed 3 percent of GDP, and 
total public debt must not exceed 60 percent of GDP 
No later than 31 December 1996, the Council of the EC will decide whether a majority 
of member countries have fulfi l1 ed the conditions for joining the EMU and , on this basis, 
whether or not to launch the third stage on January 1997. In order to accomplish this, 
they will have to take into account the convergence criteria. Note that to fulfill the 
conditions the member countries will not need to be within the range in every respect, 
since convergence criteria are merely rough and non-binding guide1ines. If the Council 
decides to launch the third stage as ea r1y as 1 J anuary 1997, it will also have to decide if 
any member country will remain temporarily outside the EMU. However, this decision is 
also not bound to the 乳11fillment of convergence criteria. If, on the other hand, the 
Council decides not to launch EMU in 1997, the third stage will automatically come into 
Aυ •••• 
a 
being on 1 January 1999. In this case, no later than 31 December 1998 , the Council wiII 
decide again, which countries are ready to join EMU and which are not 
3.2. The Meaning of Convergence Criteria 
F ew issues in the debate over the EMU have been as heavily disputed as the convergence 
criteria. The question arises whether this dispute is as important as it seems to be, since it 
is well known that these criteria are not obligatolγRather， the extent of permissible 
deviation from these criteria seems to be a question of political marketing. Similar1y, 
political power wi lI decide which countries will be permitted to join EMU and which not. 
Whatever the situation might be, it will be simply impossible to exclude e. g. France or 
Germany. The same seems to be true for the Nethe r1 ands and Belgium, even thöugh 
neither fulfiIIed the fiscal criteria in 1991 and it wiII even be technicaIIy impossible for 
Belgium to decrease its public debt from more than 131 percent of GDP to less than 60 
percent, by 1997 or by 1999 (see Table 5) . It is also questionable whether the criterion of 
total pub1ic debt is relevant at all for the judgement of stability and convergence. 
Table 5: Fulfïllment of the Convergence Criteria in 1991 
Annual groth rate Current budget Total public debt Return on bonds in 
of consumer prices detìcit in percent in percent of GDP percent 
10 percent ofGDP 
EMU reference figure 
Countrv 4.4 3.0 60.0 
Belgium 3.2 5.7 13 1.5 9.3 
Denmark 2.4 1.7 59.6 9.3 
Western Germany 3.5 3.2 43 .4 8.5 
France 3.1 1.7 47.1 9.0 
Greece 18.9 - 17.9 85.2 23.3 
UK 5.9 2.1 36.7 10.1 
Ireland 3.2 2.7 113.0 13.0 
Italy 6.4 - 10.1 103.8 13.0 
Luxembourg 3.1 1.9 6.9 8.1 
Netherlands 3.9 3.5 79.8 8.7 
Portugal 11.3 5.4 6.+ .7 17.1 
Spain 5.9 3.9 45.3 12 .4 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1992), P 8 
At this point in the discussion it seems useful to distinguish between convergence and 
stability. If we agree in principal that an appropriate institutional setting of ECB is the 
only guarantee for long-term monetary stability and that it is the very task of 
convergence prior to the third stage to avoid undue shocks in the transition to EMU, we 
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should avoid confusing the two concepts. That is to say, convergence criteria should not 
be used to evaluate future macroeconomic stability but only to measure the present 
tendency of convergence. As long as the inflation rates and interest rates of potential 
member countries are in a narrow range, and as long as reasonable exchange rates 
according to purchasing power have been maintained for some time, monetary 
adjustment shocks are unlikely, even if inflation prior to transition averaged 1 percent or 
5 percent. On the other hand , there is no guarantee that inflation wi1l remain low if the 
ECB is improperly constructed, even if it were zero prior to transition. 
In addition to monetary imbalances, fiscal imbalances will be without doubt a source of 
future macroeconomic instability. But here, it is current budget deficit rather than total 
public debt which should be observed carefully. True, fiscal imbalances are not a dírect 
source of inflation, so that it might be argued that monetary stabi1ity may well be 
maintained as long as ECB is strong enough to reject any quests for monetary expansion 
But even if ECB is given a high degree of autonomy, pressure from outside might 
become too great to resist, as has frequently been the case with the relatively 
autonomous Deutsche Bundesbank (HAMACHERlKLE肘， 1993 ~ SARGENTIW ALLACE , 
1981). Moreover, large budget deficits could push up European interest rates and cause 
a recession if ECB does not ease money supply. Finally, with a single monetary authority 
in Europe there \vill be no chance for the member states to inflate away public debts 
Thus, as long as no further credits can be taken on, the only remaining source of pub1ic 
revenue will be taxes , which cannot be increased infinitely without eroding the tax base. 
Therefore, even though the Treaty of 孔1aastricht contains a "no bail-out clause" , political 
pressure caused by insolvency in one of the countries or by economic pressure from 
macroeconomic spillovers arising from the debt problem of some countries could lead to 
violations , or even a de facto abolishm訓， of the non bail-out clause 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis: 
Concerning the threat of monetary shocks in the transition period, the convergence 
criteria seem to be adequate guides to the respective countries' monetary situation, 
since they provide information about convergence in inflation rates, interests rates, 
and a longer period of exchange-rate stability. Somewhat less satisfactory is the non-
obligatory character of the underlying criteria as well as some imprecise formulations 
with respect to exchange-rate stability. 
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By contrast, for assessing long-term monetary stability, convergence criteria appear 
to be inappropriate. Here, the institutional setting of ECB should be analyzed , 
because this will be the future source of inflation or of stability. 
一 Current deficit gives some insight into the fiscal stability of a country, while total 
public debt does no t. But since fiscal stability is of special importance for the stability 
of EMU, measuring current deficit is not enough. The future structure of fiscal 
authorities, as well as their opportunities to acquire revenues or to spill over costs of 
unsound fiscal policy to other member countries, will be the most important aspects 
of a future E!\征J.
3.3. The Importance of the European Central Bank' s Constitution 
At least formally , the ECB is basically a copy of the Deutsche Bundesbank (see KENEN, 
1992, pp. 17). Not even the strongest opponents of EMU deny tha t. As with the 
Bundesbank, the Council of the ECB consists of an executive board together with the 
president and the vice president of the ECB and four additional members; the governing 
council is made up of the governors of the National Central Banks and the members of 
the executive board. The governing council is obliged to adopt guidelines and take the 
necessary decisions to ensure a stable European currency. The executive board is 
required to implement monetary policy according to the guidelines and decisions of the 
governing council . The members of the executive board are to be appointed by the heads 
of state or government for eight years 
The ECB will be independent in the sense that neither the ECB itself nor one of the 
national central banks is obliged, or even permitted, to carry out any order from the 
institutions of the EC or those of one of the member states. Furthermore, any kind of 
credit facility given to the Community itself or to one of its member states is strictly 
prohibited 
Even though the ECB closely resembles the constitution of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
and independence in some respects is formally even more strictly guaranteed, some 
authors doubt the material independence of the ECB members. As is the case with the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, the members of the executive board will be appointed by the 
heads of the governments or states. But the Deutsche Bundesbank deals with only one 
government , and this government only suggests the members, while it is the more 
independent president of the F ederal Republic who appoints the members in the end 
Finally, the governors of the N ational Central Banks, all of whom will be members of the 
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governing council, are appointed according to different rules in the respective member 
countries alone. True, before the third stage of the EMU will be launched, all European 
central banks wi lI have been given independence. But this could be realized only one day 
before, so that a new National Central Bank' s governor might be elected right before the 
EMU comes into being, join the governing council and act only according to the wishes 
of his national government. 
Critics of EMU focus on the higher degree of "federalism" inside ECB and on the 
possibly higher degree of material dependence of the governing council' s members on 
their respective governments. ln fact , they are not against federalism in European 
monetary policy, but against federalism within a centralistic institution. Combining both 
arguments, they fear the following : Given that each member of the governing council- will 
represent his own country' s interest , and given that each countrγwill have its own 
"in f1 ation mentality" , i. e. each country will prefer one specific combination of in f1ation 
and unemployment along the Phillips-curve menu , the result can never be monetary 
stability. After being compromised between the different preferences, there will be no 
price stability but more or less an average of the in f1 ation rates that existed prior to E孔1u
(see e. g. BERTHOLD, 1992, pp. 178; G旭TSC恥以NN， 1991 , pp. 703 ; SIEBEI汀， 1992, 
p.42) . But what is more, as federalism along with the degree of different preferences 
inside ECB rise, compromising between different preferences will become more difficult, 
and thus could lead to more complicated decision-making processes 
To be sure, we do not agree with this position. This is so for mainly three reasons: 
Even though it initially seems obvious, the existence of different "inf1ation 
mentalities" is in doub t. There is no reason to depart from our fruitful economic 
assumption that people act according to existing circumstances, institutional 
structures, incentives and disincentives rather than to dubious 叮nentalities". Germany 
has experienced two destructive in f1 ations in this century and a high degree of 
macroeconomic instability in the interim. Only since the institutional structure of an 
independent central bank has been in existence, a certain degree of long-term 
monetary stability has been maintained. There is simply no reason to believe that 
monetary stability in the FRG has to do with anything other than an appropriate 
institutional structure 
一 The history of the Bundesbank teaches that whatever the political origins and former 
dependencies of the respective members might have been, and \Nhatever region they 
came from , be it a region hit by high structural problems and unemployment or a 
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prospering one with low unemployment, there have never been significant differences 
in their behavior as members of the governing council or even of the executive board 
Be it Mr. Pöhl from the Social Democrats or 孔1r. Schlesinger from the Christian 
Democrats, there has been no significant difference in monetary policy 
It is true that right before the ECB starts its work, some countries might appoint 
some loyal governors, hoping that they will represent their political interest. But this 
can only be a temporary phenomenon, since after a while governors wiII be reelected 
according to new rules. Furthermore, after election the governors of the National 
Central Banks wiII remain on their jobs for at least 5 years, no matter which kind of 
policy they actuaIIy pursue. 
To conclude, from a more conservative viewpoint one might opt against EMU, since due 
to constitutional ignorance (HA YEK) we cannot make precise and reliable predictions 
about how the institutional structure ofECB wiII work. On the other hand , analyzing this 
structure gives little reason to believe that ECB wiII do worse than the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. However, this is not to say that this structure is the best we can think 
abou t. On the contrary, the Deutsche Bundesbank and its monetary policy can be 
criticized severely. EspeciaIIy the meaning of formal independence in the absence of an 
explicit objective function of the actors of monetary policy is discussed intensively. 1n 
order to improve monetary performance in an EMU compared to the German one and 
reduce the risks of EMU stemming from constitutional ignorance, it therefore seems 
helpful to search for better arrangements, ones which include explicit incentives for the 
monetary-policy makers. 
4. The Role of Fiscal Policy 
To accept that the institutional structure ofECB and Deutsche Bundesbank do not differ 
considerably is one thing. But from this alone it does not foIIow that EMU wiII produce 
macroeconomic stability. As noted above, even the Deutsche Bundesbank has not been 
completely immune to quests for a more expansive policy to combat an economic 
slowdown. This could also be true for the ECB and , moreover, the underlying problems 
might be EMU-specific. The crucial question here is whether the decision-making 
process concerning fiscal policy of the EMU-members can be trusted or if some reform is 
necessary prior to EMU. On this point, according to earlier views from the theory of 
fiscal federalism (OA TES, 1968) some caII for a greater degree of centralization in order 
to force stability in the member countries, while others argue for fiscal competition 
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among the European states (ISSING, 1993 , pp. 158). However, in every case the question 
is whether a bail out of budget debts can be strictly excluded 
The underlying problems cannot be discussed in detail here, but some should at least be 
mentioned because of the negative experience with the German monetary union. The 
sudden integration of two regions induced a strong tendency towards rising wages in the 
economically weaker region. This in turn caused massive unemployment and an 
unprecedented demand for transfers (AKE也OF~ et al., 1991). Moreover, to enforce fiscal 
discipline, rapid reunification, and thus, political centralization, became indispensable. 
Even though the situation concerning wage negotiations, factor mobility and the 
autonomy of governments in the EC is significantly different from that in the two 
German regions, those experiences should nevertheless be taken seriously. There will 
undoubtly be some tendency to equal wages following the EMU, and there wiII alsb be 
some enhancement of factor mobility. Simultaneously, calls for a harmonization of social 
insurance-systems wi I1 become stronger and can hardly be ignored 
A11 this could strain the fiscal capacity of the poorer countries. Together with an 
incentive to spill over domestic fiscal problems via greater budget deficits, which raises 
interest rates and crowds out private investments in the whole union or via direct 
transfers, the threat of fiscal instability seems to be the most serious risk ofEMU 
Therefore , those questions should be given much more attention than convergence 
criteria or the construction of the ECB. Here, future investigations and, more 
importantly, the search for proper institutional arrangements should be the focus in order 
to avoid problems similar to those that have occurred in Germany (see also: GÄCKLE, 
1992~ KE悶N， 1992, pp. 68) 
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